Thomas Mann\u27s  Tobias Mindernickel  in Light of Sartre\u27s  Being-for-Others by Bjorklund, Beth
Studies in 20th Century Literature 
Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 2 
1-1-1978 
Thomas Mann's "Tobias Mindernickel" in Light of Sartre's "Being-
for-Others" 
Beth Bjorklund 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl 
 Part of the French and Francophone Literature Commons, German Literature Commons, and the 
Modern Literature Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Bjorklund, Beth (1978) "Thomas Mann's "Tobias Mindernickel" in Light of Sartre's "Being-for-Others"," 
Studies in 20th Century Literature: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 2. https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1050 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Studies in 20th Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, 
please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
Thomas Mann's "Tobias Mindernickel" in Light of Sartre's "Being-for-Others" 
Abstract 
Sartre's analysis of "Being-for-Others" in Being and Nothingness describes the Self-Other relationship as 
essentially one of conflict, with the Self attempting either to dominate or to be dominated by the Other. 
Subject-Object relations are a common theme also in the early works of Thomas Mann, who gives artistic 
expression to many of the same problems which Sartre later formalized in a philosophical theory. 
The sado-masochistic character, which is portrayed in several of Thomas Mann's narratives, receives its 
strongest expression in the story "Tobias Mindernickel," which is here singled out for analysis. Humiliation 
gives rise to aggression, as the protagonist feels both an attraction and a repulsion for his surrogate lover, 
a dog. The interpersonal relationships revealed here serve as paradigmatic illustration of Sartre's theory 
of "Concrete Relations with Others." 
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THOMAS MANN'S "TOBIAS MINDERNICKEL" IN 
LIGHT OF SARTRE'S "BEING-FOR-OTHERS" 
BETH BJORKLUND 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville 
Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness proposes not only an 
ontology but also a philosophical anthropology which describes the 
rational/irrational nature of man's "Concrete Relations with 
Others." Interpersonal relations are seen as based on the subject/ 
object conflict, in which the "I" attempts to turn the "Other" into 
an object in order to maintain the subject status of the self. A 
principal manifestation of the conflict is, literally or figuratively, 
"the look" (le regard), for in "being seen" one becomes painfully 
aware of the self and the accompanying guilt, shame, and fear. The 
self can, conversely, return the gaze and thus transcend the other's 
transcendence. The two poles of human emotions, love and hate, 
represent basic sado-masochistic tendencies, for in love the subject 
attempts to lose the self in the object, and in hate the subject 
attempts to annihilate the object to maintain subjectivity. An 
"authentic" relationship is as difficult to achieve as authentic exis- 
tence, and human relations are more often seen as vascillating be- 
tween the extremes of attraction and repulsion. 
A Sartrean framework is useful for investigating literary por- 
trayals of interpersonal relationships. The power of "the look" has 
been understood at least since the ancient Egyptian depiction of the 
eye and the Greek myth of the Gorgon Medusa. It is also a frequent 
motif in modern German literature, in works of writers such as 
E.T.A. Hoffmann, Biichner, Hauptmann, and Kafka. The present in- 
vestigation is devoted to Thomas Mann's short story entitled "To- 
bias Mindernickel" (1897), which serves as paradigmatic illustration 
not only of the gaze but also of the resulting sadomasochistic actions 
of an individual in extreme isolation. For the protagonist, a dog is 
an "ideal lover" in that it is free, yet dependent, a fact that elicits 
103 1
Bjorklund: Thomas Mann's "Tobias Mindernickel" in Light of Sartre's "Being-f
Published by New Prairie Press
104 STCL, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1978) 
a love/hate response on the part of the master, analogous to other 
often-noted polarities in the works of Thomas Mann. Without wish- 
ing to make Thomas Mann into an "existentialist," I would suggest 
that the interpersonal relations portrayed in the story are illus- 
trative of Sartre's theory of "Being-for-Others" in Being and No- 
thingness, published nearly half a century later.' 
The focus in the story "Tobias Mindernickel" is on the title 
figure, who is sketched with the selectivity and linearity reminiscent 
of the Novelle form. The protagonist is a Thomas Mannian outsider, 
in this case not an artist but simply a loner, who lives in almost 
total isolation from society. That the reader is given no direct 
insight into the personality of the character is presumably due to 
the fact that the narrator, in his ironic first-person stance, has no 
access to the consciousness of the character he has created (although 
that character's initials are identical with those of the author). The 
narrator assumes the role of the external observer who then specu- 
lates on the internal processes of consciousness. Frequent occur- 
rence of clauses such as "It seems that ... ," "He appeared as if ... ," 
"It is possible that ..." puts the actual assertion into a subordinate 
clause, making it grammatically dependent upon the perceiving 
consciousness, to whom the events appear as baffling as they do 
to the reader - and, apparently, also to the protagonist, who 
seems to be a puzzle to himself. The narrator introduces his topic 
as follows: "There was a story about this man; I tell it, because 
it is both puzzling and sinister, to an extraordinary degree" (p. 51). 
Since the narrator is ostensibly limited to observational state- 
ments, he gives a description of the physical appearance as a clue 
to interiority: "Mindernickel's exterior was odd, striking, and pro- 
voking to laughter" (p. 51). Physical features are significant, for in 
Sartrean thought the body is the primordial contact with the world; 
it determines a psychic space and constitutes the totality of meaning- 
ful relations to the world (an aspect which receives even greater 
emphasis in the writings of Merleau-Ponty). Indications - in cloth- 
ing, mannerisms, and furniture - that Mindernickel belongs to a 
higher class of folk than that with which he is associated suggest 
a discrepancy, a non-coincidence of appearance and reality, that the 
pour-soi is what it is not and is not what it is. Mindernickel expe- 
riences a desire to relate to something outside the self, yet he is 
hermetically sealed off, with access neither to society, nor to nature 2
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- nor to the self. He has, apparently, never found a way to live, 
for "there seems to be missing in him the natural superiority with 
which the normal, perceptive individual looks out upon the phe- 
nomenal world. He seems to measure himself against each pheno- 
menon and find himself wanting; his gaze shifts and falls and gro- 
vels before men and things" (p. 51). His state of isolation seems 
total, and solipsism leads to monotony and despair, as he becomes 
at least vaguely aware of the contingency of being. 
In this situation of alienation, the encounter between self and 
world is critical, and Sartre's discussion of Being-for-Others is 
helpful in analyzing the nature of the relationships. For Sartre, self- 
consciousness is pure interiority, and I cannot be an object for 
myself. The Other is thus the mediator between me and myself, and 
my being-for-myself depends upon my being-for-others. This self- 
other relation, however, is at its core one of conflict: "The Other is 
presented in a certain sense as the radical negation of my experience, 
since he is the one for whom I am not subject but object .... While 
I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is 
trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the 
Other, the Other seeks to enslave me" (BN, p. 340). This is clearly 
a reflection of Hegel's illustrious doctrine of master and slave.2 
One means of enslavement is the gaze, and the Other is then the 
one who looks at me and thus turns me into an object: "With 
the Other's look the 'situation' escapes me .... I am no longer 
master of the situation" (BN, p. 241). "The Other as a look is only 
that - my transcendence transcended" (BN, p. 239). 
This power of the look is the reason, we are told, why Minder- 
nickel rarely leaves his room. People make fun of him; children 
laugh and mock, and adults come to the doors to look. He is an 
object in the eyes of others, and further, he is an object for their 
amusement and ridicule. Sartre discusses shame as the recognition 
of oneself before the Other: Shame is "the recognition of the fact 
that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and 
judging" (BN, p. 237). "The alienation of myself, which is the act 
of being-looked-at, involves the alienation of the world which I 
organize" (BN, p. 239). One could turn back upon the Other so as 
to make an object out of him and thus transcend the Other. Min- 
dernickel, however, is unable to return the look of the others, but 
instead keeps his eyes cast to the ground. For all the opaqueness 3
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of character, he is in their eyes transparent, naked, and exposed 
as he walks: "He made no defence, glancing timidly round ... like 
a man hurrying through a driving rain without an umbrella" 
(p. 51). His being, so defined by their look, is in flight, pursued by 
the Other. This defenseless state is accompanied by fear as well 
as by shame, and even when others laugh in his face, he greets 
with humble politeness. Fear, for Sartre, "implies that I appear to 
myself as threatened by virtue of my being a presence in the world" 
(BN, p. 264). "We resign ourselves to seeing ourselves through the 
Other's eyes. ... We cause our body to be designated for us as it 
is for the Other by utilizing these designations to denote our body 
as it is for us" (BN, p. 330). Mindernickel is acutely and constantly 
aware of his body not as it is for him but as it is for the Other. 
He has so thoroughly internalized the opinion of others that it 
is not dependent upon the presence of an observer: "Further on, 
when the children had stopped behind and he was not known, and 
scarcely noted, his manner did not change. He still hurried on, still 
stooped, as though a thousand mocking eyes were on him" (p. 52). 
Sartre discusses the state of being-looked-at in the absence of an 
observer, when "the Other is present everywhere, below me, above 
me, in the neighboring rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly 
my being-for-others" (BN, p. 253). This explains why Mindernickel 
has no perception of the world, of nature or of people, for, as 
Sartre notes: "We can not perceive the world and at the same time 
apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the 
other. This is because to apprehend a look is to be conscious of 
being looked at. The look which the eyes manifest is a pure refer- 
ence to myself" (BN, pp. 234-35).3 
In contrast to this object status, an episode is related in which 
Tobias acts as a free subject. When a child receives a mild injury 
at the hands of playmates, Tobias steps in to help. In the first 
instance of direct discourse in the story, one hears him expressing 
sympathy and giving something of himself (if only a handkerchief) 
to another human being, who is in this case an object because of 
his momentarily helpless states. This assertion of free subjectivity 
is so gratifying to him that he can now look people in the eye: 
"His eyes looked larger and brighter, he looked squarely at people 
and things" (p. 53). However temporary the new self-image may 4
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be, one surmises that it gave impetus to his decision to restructure 
the self-other relations in his life. 
One does not know his intentions when, one Sunday morning, 
he takes a walk along an elegant promenade and there buys a 
dog. He seems nervous about this "project upon the world" and 
walks around the dog three times, keeping his eyes fixed on him. 
After the transaction is completed, Tobias pulls on the line, glan- 
cing fearfully about, and amid the laughter of observers he finally 
gets the dog to his room, from which they scarcely depart. Here 
begins the description of a subject-object confrontation which is, 
at its core, sado-masochistic. Significantly, it is an animal that 
plays the counterpart to Tobias. An adult relationship would, 
presumably, be too threatening, and even in the case of the child, 
Tobias was able to act as a subject only as long as the child was 
injured, i. e. dependent. Not wishing to speculate on the conscious- 
ness of animals, one can at least say that they are not self- 
conscious. 4 As part of the natural world, animals apparently expe- 
rience no conflict between being and consciousness (which may be 
the reason they photograph so well). Perhaps even a cat would be 
too strong a subject for Tobias (as it was for BUchner's Lenz); 
but a dog's allegiance is unquestionable and the desire to please 
nearly insatiable, so emotionally dependent is a dog upon his 
master. 6 
To escape the terrible loneliness and anguish of solipsism, To- 
bias needs another subject that will freely love him, yet one that 
will not be so free as to withdraw that love. Freedom must be 
limited to the prescribed realm, for Tobias cannot love that which 
he cannot control. The dog, as a free natural subject is capable of 
being converted into a controllable cultural object and is thus an 
"ideal lover" for Tobias - free, yet dependent. Sartre writes, the 
lover "wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this 
freedom as freedom should no longer be free .... He wants 
this freedom to be captured by itself" (BN, p. 343). Although the 
relationship in the story is non-sexual in the physical sense, it has 
rightfully been said that all existence has a sexual significance and 
that every sexual phenomenon has an existential significance. 
Sartre finds three patterns of behavior possible in love: One may 
lapse into indifference; one may turn to masochism, which is the 
attempt to become a thing to be controlled by the other; or one 5
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may turn to sadism, which entails trying to possess the other by 
violence. Conflict is thus the inevitable basis of the love relationship. 
Just as Tobias was victimized by others, he now makes the dog 
a victim. His feeling of humiliation gives rise to aggression, and in 
this inter-animal relationship he asserts all the subjectivity which 
was denied him in inter-personal relationships. Sartre understands 
sadism as "a refusal to be incarnated and a flight from all facticity 
and at the same time an effort to get hold of the Other's facticity" 
(BN, p. 375). It is not merely the will to dominate or the thirst 
for power; rather, sadism is born from anxiety in the face of the 
Other. "What the sadist seeks to appropriate is in actuality 
the transcendent freedom of the victim. But this freedom remains 
on principle out of reach" (BN, p. 381).8 
The struggle of two warring subjectivities which began at the 
moment of contact continues upon arrival at home, as Tobias 
discovers that with the incentive of food he can control the dog. 
As the dog becomes tired and does not obey, Tobias reacts by 
striking him with a stick. Shortly thereafter, however, comes the 
peripeteia as his emotions change from anger to contempt, to pity, 
and to love. When the dog licks Tobias' face and boots, it is like 
a caress, and Tobias virtually loses himself in emotion: "He pres- 
sed the dog passionately to his breast, his eyes filling with tears" 
(p. 55). In this displacement of and substitution for human rela- 
tions, Tobias gives to and receives from the dog the "love" which 
was denied him in relations with others. His situation before the 
Other - be it man or dog - is one of helplessness and sense of 
inferiority. Sartre writes: "Masochism is a perpetual effort to 
annihilate the subject's subjectivity by causing it to be assimilated 
by the Other; this effort is accompanied by the exhausting and 
delicious consciousness of failure so that finally it is the failure 
itself which the subject ultimately seeks as his principle goal" 
(BN, p. 355).9 
The narration of direct discourse when Tobias addresses the 
dog is reminiscent of his brief encounter with the child, and in 
both cases the discourse has only emotive, no conceptual content, 
as the speaker tries to awaken sympathy for his own despair. The 
"dialogue" is, of course, a monologue, and Tobias personifies 
the dog in order to have a conversation partner, speaking with 
him as though he were human. Communication between man and 6
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animal is, of course, not unusual; what is exceptional is the tota- 
lity and the exclusiveness of this mode of relating to the world - and, consequently, the impossibility of relating at all. There is 
no indication that Tobias spoke with human beings or even with 
the self. Internal processes seem to be on a preverbal, perhaps 
pre-reflective level, and language for Tobias is not a live option 
for self-expression. In the absence of language, the "look" is all 
the more revealing, for it also "speaks." At a time when he feels 
dominant it is a "proud and angry look," and for comparison the 
narrator conjures up the image of Napoleon with the illusion (de- 
lusion) of grandeur. His eyes later fill with tears, language breaks 
down, and with "mild eyes" he speechlessly gazes at the dog (p. 55). 
The dominance relations develop with increasing intensity and 
constant power shifts. Tobias devotes total time and attention to 
the care of his pet, who is known as "Esau" (which name perhaps 
contains a reference to the biblical Esau, whose birthright, i.e. right 
to existence, was appropriated by the other). Tobias, quite unders- 
tandably, has no desire to appear with the dog in public. The re- 
sulting confinement is restrictive for the animal, but it is precisely 
in this state of "shared isolation" that Tobias can maintain the 
subject-object dependence which seemingly fulfills his dual desire 
to give up the self to another and to dominate another. When the 
dog lies beside Tobias on the sofa and gazes at him with soft, mel- 
ancholy eyes, Tobias is pleased. When, on the other hand, the 
dog demonstrates his natural vitality and independence, Tobias 
becomes insecure; this state produces a psychological feeling of 
distance and an emotional response of anger. "Then Tobias followed 
his motions from afar with a helpless, disapproving, wandering look 
and a hateful, peevish smile" (p. 56). This leads to violence, and on 
one occasion when the dog escapes out the door, causing Tobias to 
make a public spectacle of himself, the beating is especially hard. 
Sartre discusses hate, which "implies a recognition of the Other's 
freedom.... The occasion which arouses hate is simply an act by 
the Other which puts me in the state of being subject to his free- 
dom. This act is in itself humiliating; it is humiliating as the con- 
crete revelation of my instrumental objectness in the face of the 
Other's freedom" (BN, p. 387). 
As Esau one day is "accidentally" injured (by running into the 
knife with which Tobias is cutting the animal's food), the master 7
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is greatly alarmed; yet, the narrator relates, "a gleam of relief and 
happiness came over his face" (p. 56). With the injured dog in a 
state of dependence, Tobias can maintain the subject role, and he 
cares for the "invalid" day and night. As Esau begins to recover, 
however, Tobias becomes progressively more restless, and he no 
longer nurses the wound, perhaps subconsciously wishing it would 
not heal. He feels the other escaping him and senses that he cannot 
fully possess him. When Esau has fully recovered and is again ex- 
periencing the joy of life, it is then the catastrophe occurs. Sig- 
nificantly, it is at a moment when Tobias attempts to be near the 
dog that he is rejected, as the dog snaps at the hand which would 
have stroked him. A conglomerate of emotions - fear, hate, and 
contempt - well up within him, and Tobias, with a "sidelong, 
jealous, and angry look" takes the knife, and all is over. Tobias 
goes so far as to kill the dog in order to establish the dominance 
relations. 
The intentionality of the act is in this case a difficult question. 
Although his actions are clearly directional, he seems to be so little 
aware of his own ambivalent emotions that the results are surpris- 
ing to him and at once wanted and unwanted. Even on the occasion 
of the first beating, it was as if some unknown force in a schizoid 
personality had taken control over what the reader and the pro- 
tagonist - knew to be "Tobias," and in the final act his movements 
are termed "mechanical." Repetition of the penultimate scene in the 
denouement, in which he wounds the dog in exactly the same place, 
indicates both the intentionality and the blindness of his motiva- 
tion: when the dog is accidentally injured, he nurses him back 
to health; but finding the object thus to be escaping him, he 
injures him again mortally. Perhaps the "ideal" state would be 
some minimal form of existence in which the dog remained alive 
but was totally dependent upon the other. Since such a condition 
of stasis cannot be prolonged in a living organism, Tobias has to 
kill to make permanent the object position of the Other. Sartre 
discusses this means of attempting to get hold of the Other's free- 
dom: "If I killed him I would in a way possess him, but since he 
would no longer be free, this would not satisfy me. He would have 
escaped me in the end, by dying. On the other hand, if he is still 
free, then he necessarily escapes me" (BN, p. 380).10 8
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Since Tobias seems not to understand his own emotions, he 
neither chooses his responses nor accepts responsibility for the 
consequences. He utters a final monologue of "sympathy" (in quota- 
tion marks, since the possibility of syn-pathos, i.e. "feeling togeth- 
er," is annihilated by the solipsism that dooms him to the window- 
less prison of the self). The dog dies like a sacrificial lamb, "his 
clouded, questioning eyes directed upon his master, with a look of 
complaint, innocence, and incomprehension" (p. 57). Tobias lays 
his face on Esau's body and "weeps bitter tears." The last phrase 
may have biblical undertones, for Peter, the prototypical betrayer, 
also "wept bitterly." One surmises that Peter, like Tobias, must 
have been a puzzle to himself, feeling both an attraction to another 
being and a repulsion as that being escaped him. Tobias, who had 
died a thousand deaths in the eyes of others, tried to restructure 
his relationship to the world. His failure is as total as that attempt 
in the opposite direction of Kafka's Josef K., who, having given up 
his subjectivity, dies like a dog. The problem of how to reconcile 
conflicting free choices seems not to admit of solution. 
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in Thomas Manns friihen Erzahlungen," in Gedenkschrift fiir Thomas Mann, 
ed. Rolf Wiecher (Kopenhagen: Verlag Text & Kontext, 1975), pp. 67-94. 
10 In Thomas Mann's story entitled "Luischen," Amra, more or 
less intentionally, causes her husband's death through humiliation; or, seen 
the other way around, he, more or less intentionally, lets himself be so 
humiliated. Similar themes occur in "Anekdote" and, with a reversal of roles, 
in "Ein Gluck." On a different conceptual level one is reminded of the rumi- 
nations of BUchner's Leonce concerning which is preferable, a live or a dead 
lover, with the conclusion: "Ich will deine Leiche lieben" (Buchner, "Leonce 
und Lena," I.iii., op. cit., p. 122). 10
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